Religion, Political Culture, and the Law by Wilson, John F.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 3 Spring 1992 Article 6 
Religion, Political Culture, and the Law 
John F. Wilson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
John F. Wilson, Religion, Political Culture, and the Law, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 821 (1992) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol41/iss3/6 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
RELIGION, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND THE LAW
John F. Wilson*
INTRODUCTION
A noteworthy development has occurred over the last several decades,
namely a marked opening up of inquiry into the nature of law in our society.
This means that attention has been directed to the broader cultural setting in
which law is located. Before reflecting on this development as a background, it
first makes sense to indicate the nature of my interests.
If not a specialist in the law, I am one of many scholars in related fields who
have been drawn, we might even say compelled, to recognize its increasing
importance in our common life at the end of the twentieth century. As a stu-
dent of religion in our culture, I have been directing a project for much of the
last decade. Essentially it is a historian's undertaking, dedicated to creating a
small library of studies concerned with religion and law, or the church-state
issue, as it has developed in the United States as a modern nation. The earliest
publication was an innovative casebook constructed by Judge John Noonan
before he was appointed to the bench, entitled The Believer and the Powers
that Are.' Two volumes of bibliographical essays on periods and issues in our
national history followed.' Now they are being supplemented by monographs
on critical epochs in our national history, and studies of several other cultures
as well.3 These will provide points of comparison and contrast to explore how
* Agate Brown & George L. Collord Professor of Religion, Princeton University. This essay is
adapted from the DePaul College of Law's Center for Church/State Studies 1991 Annual Lec-
ture. 1 appreciate very much the hospitality extended to me by Dean John C. Roberts of the
College of Law and by Mr. Craig B. Mousin, Executive Director of the Center for Church/State
Studies.
I. JOHN T. NOONAN. JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE (1987).
2. 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE, THE COLONIAL AND EARLY
NATIONAL PERIODS (John F. Wilson ed., 1986); 2 CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: A BIBLIO-
GRAPHICAL GUIDE. THE COLONIAL AND EARLY NATIONAL PERIODS, THE CIVIL WAR TO THE
PRESENT DAY (John F. Wilson ed., 1987).
3. As of the fall of 1991, the following studies are available: ROBERT T. HANDY, UNDERMINED
ESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN AMERICA, 1880-1920 (John F. Wilson ed., 1991);
HELEN HARDACRE, SHINTO AND THE STATE, 1868-1988 (John F. Wilson ed., 1989); PETER I.
KAUFMAN. REDEEMING POLITICS (John F. Wilson ed., 1990); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUC-
TURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II (John F. Wilson
ed., 1988).
In 1992, the following studies will be published by the Princeton University Press: NICHOLAS J.
DEMERATH & RHYS WILLIAMS, A BRIDGING OF FAITHS (John F. Wilson ed., forthcoming 1992);
DANIEL H. LEVINE, POPULAR VOICES IN LATIN AMERICAN CATHOLICISM (John F. Wilson ed.,
forthcoming 1992). Five additional studies are currently being written.
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political and religious authority necessarily interact, as they do, in this and
other societies. This essay, then, will draw on the perspectives undergirding the
Project on Church and State at Princeton University.
As mentioned previously, an opening up of inquiry into the nature of law in
our social life has taken place. This surely reflects the relentless course of liti-
gation in American society across the last half century. In turn, the law nar-
rowly considered has offered an idiom or paradigm (if we may still use that
term) for the extraordinary expansion of bureaucratic and administrative
structures to make possible government programs in which citizens have very
specific interests and against which they make claims. This includes not only
such obvious examples as the Social Security and Veterans Administration
programs but also others that reach restricted subsets of the population-such
as dairy farmers, to take one case. Successive disruptions of the society-for
example, the Great Depression and the great mobilization for war following
it-had the effect of eroding, perhaps destroying altogether, many of the com-
munity mechanisms that had provided supporting structures for human
life-in family crises, sickness, old age, whatever. Among those community
structures decisively weakened were religious institutions and related agencies
with varying degrees of independence from them. In sum, by this last decade
of the twentieth century, the law has become ubiquitous in our common life in
at least two senses. First, the direct role of the law narrowly conceived has
expanded to enable us to cope with the unprecedented enlargement and com-
plexification of the national society. But second, and no less important, the
indirect role of the law serves as an idiom or way of framing the relationships
of citizens to each other as well as to governments that have been elaborated,
especially in this century.
Accordingly, there has been a much-enlarged interchange concerning "law"
in our culture, and it has taken many forms. In a broad sense, it has entailed
simply more extensive teaching about the law and greater familiarity with it.
Examples run a gamut, with one end in the academy. For instance, it is now
taken for granted that the traditional constitutional interpretation course, of-
fered to undergraduates in politics departments, should be supplemented by
historians' offerings about the law. At the other end, in popular culture, we
might instance such a popular television program as "L.A. Law." But in a
narrower sense, striking, indeed arresting developments internal to the study of
law have emerged. For example, specialists in law schools seek out such arcane
fields as hermeneutics, the science of interpretation of texts in literature or
theology, or the interpretive strategies of the Talmudic tradition to understand
more effectively the nature of law as a cultural activity. And there has been
self-conscious appropriation from such diverse fields as moral philosophy and
Marxian social criticism to comprehend the internal logic of the law, on the
one hand, and the social determinants of its decisions on the other. To an
outsider, such developments as these surely mark a new era in our legal tradi-
tions. An interesting question arises at this point: Do such interpretations of
the law, presupposing it is within and not above the network of social reality,
work to demystify it, to diminish it, and finally to lessen its claim upon mem-
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bers of the society? Another query necessarily follows: If the authority of law
is reduced in this way, will our society eventually find some other authority to
ground the order of the common life?
Against the background of such reflections, one subject strikes me as funda-
mental: the changing relationship in our society between religion and law. Per-
haps we can be more precise and stipulate the undoubted particularism of
religion together with its increasingly private qualities (which translate di-
rectly, whether or not we like it, into cultural pluralism) and the ubiquity of
and increasing competence attributed to law (in both restricted and elaborated
senses). A term like "political culture," for example, identifies a medium
within which we may comprehend this shifting relationship in our society. This
essay hopes to explore, and thus emphasizes, the side of the picture concerning
religion-its institutions, its ideological claims, its social roles. The correspond-
ing story might, indeed must, be traced out with respect to law. Perhaps a
better qualified student of the law than I can be induced to undertake that
task. No doubt the topic is there to be limned with care and skill.
The basic theme of this essay, then, concerns the decisive shift between the
late eighteenth century and our own time with respect to the place and role of
religion in the political culture. This subject discloses more discontinuities than
continuities. For example, the constitutional clauses concerning religion are
made to serve very different purposes in our era than they did two centuries
ago. To be slightly contentious for a moment, this means a quest for their
original intent is misconceived if we presume that once discovered that intent
can be readily transposed into our time and made directly applicable to it.
Discovery of their original intent, at least as one might apply it to the subject
of the religion clauses, is an investigation fraught with many challenges. But,
if pursued and finally concluded, the quest is not ended. Such a discovery does
not produce an obvious understanding of what the founders might have meant
for us to do could they have imagined our world. With respect to religion, the
founders' world was markedly different from ours. As a result, any direct ap-
plication of their "intent," however determined, would assuredly have different
consequences in our time. No one denies that the quest for original intent
behind the religion clauses is difficult. It is less frequently recognized, however,
that even if successfully concluded it could not directly inform us as we enter
the third century of the American polity. Thus, my theme cuts very directly to
the fundamental issue of how law shapes and is in turn shaped by this society,
albeit in terms of the relation of law and religion.
How may we understand and conceptualize the role or roles played by reli-
gion in the political culture that sustains the American national community?
This issue arose at the outset of the national experience, specifically when the
Constitution was framed. Close attention to it at that point is the necessary
starting point for illuminating American practices even in the last decade of
the twentieth century.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS
It is misleading to look at the two religion clauses of the First Amendment,
where the issue is thought to be joined, without also considering the religion
clause of the Constitution proper: Article VI, Section 3. "[N]o religious Test
shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office of public Trust under
the United States."'4 This provision has been largely ignored in modern writing
about the context and origins of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the Bill of Rights. The good reason for this is that the Article no longer has
currency. In 1961, the Supreme Court effectively ruled on the religious test
issue at state and local levels, subsuming it under the First Amendment as
applied through the Fourteenth.' For purposes of historical interpretation, on
the other hand, it retains its significance. For, at least as much as the First
Amendment, and perhaps more, it helps us get at how the Founding Fathers
viewed religion and the place they thought it would have in the new United
States they were attempting to construct.
In the context of the Constitutional Convention, the founders believed that
with Article VI, Section 3, they had said all that was required about the rela-
tionship of religion to the proposed federal government. The two additional
clauses of the First Amendment supplemented that basic provision already in
the Constitution. Implicitly, Congress had been prohibited from legislating
about religious establishment or abridging the free exercise of religion8 in Sec-
tions 8 and 9 of Article I, which respectively enumerated the powers vested in,
and detailed certain limitations upon, Congress.7 Thus, the burden of the two
religion clauses in the Bill of Rights was to make explicit what was already
assumed, namely that religion was a subject beyond the power of the Congress
to regulate, even as Article VI had specified that religion should not be a crite-
rion for eligibility to hold public office under the United States.
The treatment of religion in Article VI is noteworthy in the context of the
founders' work. The Article requires both state and federal officeholders to
take an oath of allegiance to the federal government. But while it explicitly
rules out a religious test for federal offices, it is silent about such tests at the
state level-where they were in fact common. In this, the Article anticipates
the eventual language of the First Amendment clauses; they placed no limit on
the states with respect to actions concerning either the "establishment" or the
"free exercise" of religion-while denying any authority in the matter to Con-
gress. Thus, both the Constitution proper and the First Amendment clauses
treat religion as simply beyond the reach of the federal government in both
executive and legislative branches.
Understood in this way, the three clauses clearly cohered around a premise
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
5. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); see also NOONAN, supra note 1, at 308-09 (ex-
cerpting the Torcaso case).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 9.
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that the new federal government would stand independent of religion. This
represented a calculated course of action that was a departure for its time and
at odds with practices recently codified in many state constitutions. Such prac-
tices differed widely. Many of the new states included a religious requirement
or test for office holding-although the construction of the tests and the rigor
with which they were applied varied. The states' practices also varied greatly
with respect both to provision for public support of religion through taxation
and to guarantees for religious liberty. 8 But of three typical points of interac-
tion between governments of the day and religion-religious tests for office,
mandated support for religion, and protection of religious liberty-only the
first was conceivably of concern to the founders as they constructed a form of
government to replace the Articles of Confederation. Hypothetically, the foun-
ders might have proposed a broad-gauged religious test-let us say they might
have required a general affirmation of Christianity, or perhaps a statement of
belief in God, whether held to be revealed in Scripture or portrayed as the god
of Nature. These would have been consistent with other actions they took. But
if such might have been plausible, it was entirely unthinkable that the foun-
ders should propose that Congress have power to legislate concerning religion.
Why should this have been so?
The overriding and certainly most critical issue of the day was to gain ac-
ceptance for, and thus ratification of, the new federal structure, a government
designed to have a reach adequate to the needs of the new nation-that is
authority and power over finance, commerce, and the conduct of war. In part
at least, this new government would, unlike the Articles of Confederation,
draw its mandate directly from the people. Such a scheme challenged the
briefly sovereign states, each newly liberated from colonial status. The only
conceivable strategy available to the founders in seeking to secure support for
their proposal was to champion limitations upon the authority of the new fed-
eral government with respect to matters not critical to achieving this essential
objective.
Religious practices and opinions were a kind of social and cultural activity
over which the extension of federal authority would only serve to weaken the
new government. Much the same might be said about education (which is
unacknowledged in the Constitution), for the beginnings of concern for com-
mon schooling can be traced to this period. 9 To have proposed that the federal
government should have jurisdiction over either education or religion would
have assured rejection of the Constitution in the process of its ratification by
the states. Unless we recognize the political necessity-and the theoretical im-
port as well-of these calculations necessary to secure the federal structure of
the new government of the United States, we cannot understand why the three
8. The state provisions regarding religion are gathered together and most readily consulted in
EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: RELIGION AND THE NEW NATION app. B at 159-74
(1987).
9. GERARD V. BRADLEY. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 125-31 (1987) (discuss-
ing the importance of schooling in the post-revolutionary period).
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particular religion clauses (and none on education) are present, or why they
remained largely unapplied, and essentially unexplicated, for a century and a
half.
Much has been made recently of seeking the "original intent" behind the
First Amendment religion clauses.10 That phrase itself is equivocal, for it sug-
gests the quest is not disinterested but is, indeed, directly motivated by modern
objectives and convictions. One such conviction is that the First Amendment
clauses have been misused in modern jurisprudence. That is, positions have
been elaborated in decisions under both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses that have summed to erroneous modern policies and practices. An-
other commonly held conviction is that there was a single-minded understand-
ing of religion in relation to the polity that took for granted accommodation
between them. But in my view there was neither a simple programmatic intent
(separationist or accommodationist), nor a single mind behind the clauses.
Rather, the three clauses represent a fundamental consensus that the new na-
tional government had to be developed independent of the question of reli-
gion-for religion was so potentially divisive as an issue that to have at-
tempted to constitutionalize its place and role surely would have brought the
new United States down, indeed prevented it from being formed.
From this perspective, we should not be surprised that no one of these three
clauses received significant attention from the Supreme Court until well into
the twentieth century. Of course, the question whether Article VI, Section 3,
ruling out religious tests for federal office, governs state and local office-hold-
ing as well was finally addressed by the Torcaso case, in which the Supreme
Court found Maryland's vestigial requirement of an oath invalid under the
First Amendment." In the last half-century, the First Amendment clauses
themselves have become important through incorporation by means of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 This means that the original
10. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent offers the clearest expression of the "original intent" objective of any Supreme
Court opinion. Id.; see also NOONAN, supra note 1, at 422-26 (excerpting the Wallace decision).
Of course the term "original intent" has been used very extensively and in different literatures.
II. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court,
which reaffirmed both the incorporation of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and the broad interpretation given the Establish-
ment Clause in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Torcaso. 367 U.S. at 492-93.
12. This incorporation of the First Amendment religion clauses through the Fourteenth was
first made explicit by the Supreme Court in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases. See, e.g., Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that a license tax violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments when applied as a precondition to religious canvassing and leaflet distribution); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (affirming an injunction against the
West Virginia Board of Education to restrain enforcement of a regulation requiring public school
children to salute the flag); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 696 (1940) (holding that a Con-
necticut statute prohibiting solicitation of money for religious purposes violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments). But see Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (refus-
ing to enjoin school district from prohibiting children who chose not to salute the flag from attend-
ing public school). See generally NOONAN, supra note 1, at 233-54 (excerpting the above-cited
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prohibition on congressional legislation has been extended in two modes. First,
the Establishment Clause has become a provision regulating the operation of
all levels of government, a reach certainly never envisioned in, and indeed di-
rectly counter to, its original formulation. And second, the clause protecting
free exercise is construed as a right to, or guarantee of, religious liberty on the
analogy of other First Amendment rights, like those of speech and assembly.
So, through incorporation, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses have
been transformed, singly and interactively, to regulate numerous institutional
arrangements and to protect individual behaviors in ways simply unimaginable
in the late eighteenth century.
This abbreviated summary of the modern reconceptualization of the three
religion clauses is cast in an essentially narrow jurisprudential framework. Our
inquiry concerning these clauses must begin, but cannot end, there. Much
broader perspectives are required to understand why this occurred, that is to
say, how the actual place of religion developed from the founding to the mid-
twentieth century. For, as we have noted, in their original context these
clauses made sense of a specific sort because they expressed the political real-
ity undergirding the new nation-a reality that subsequently changed dramat-
ically. In this perspective, it is not sufficient to focus on court decisions; we
must understand the social aspects of religion that were taken for granted, and
thus largely uncontested, as the United States developed. Such a window on
the social world permits us to observe the terms in which individuals and
groups have continued to work out the place of religion in the common life. 8
This is a very large subject indeed, and in one essay we cannot begin to ex-
plore it adequately. We can, however, sketch out a line of inquiry that will
suggest, first, how the clauses were synergistic with social characteristics of
the early nation. But, in turn, that approach leads us to recognize the chang-
ing status of religion through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Inevita-
bly, this leads us to observe how the clauses have been reconceptualized.
II. RELIGION IN EARLY AMERICAN CULTURE
Hegemony is a useful term to help delineate the cultural synthesis of the
new nation, suffused as it was with Protestant versions of Christian ideals. The
concept serves several purposes. One is to contrast this construct with the rela-
tively well-defined and limited institutions of government that it encompassed
and through which it exerted influence. Another purpose is to suggest that this
cultural reality, while derived from and imbued with largely Protestant ideals
and interests, was not identical with the institutional life of churches-neither
a particular subset of them nor an inclusive grouping. Finally, such a concept
permits us to identify several kinds of social change: changing relationships
cases).
13. See Stephen Botein, Religious Dimensions of the Early American State, in BEYOND CON-
FEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 315 (Richard
Beeman el al. eds., 1987) (discussing the religious aspects of early American constitutional law).
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among governmental and religious institutions, changing relationships between
both kinds of institution and the hegemonic culture, and, most basically,
change in that culture itself through time.
Turning the subject in this way provides one means of analyzing the place
of religion in the new nation: What do the three clauses we have been discuss-
ing disclose about early national society? For example, Article VI, Section 3,
put the proposed provisions for the federal government at odds with the prac-
tices of many state governments that routinely required religious tests for of-
fice-holding and demanded oaths of office. It would be naive for us to imagine,
however, that in the founders' views the constitutional prohibition of a reli-
gious test for office at the federal level would strip from the still-required oath-
taking its traditional grounding in religion and its presumed linkage to moral-
ity. Indeed, in his Farewell Address (September 17, 1796), George Washing-
ton spoke at some length on the importance of virtue, or morality, as "a neces-
sary spring of popular government."1 Making the connection explicit, he
framed a rhetorical question: "Where is the security for property, for reputa-
tion, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the
instruments of investigation in the courts of justice?""' So even while declar-
ing impermissible a religious test for federal office, the founders believed that
sanctions deriving from religion most certainly empowered oaths in the courts,
and presumably those entailed in office-holding as well.
In similar fashion, it would also be naive for us to imagine that the prohibi-
tion of a religious test for federal office secularized the conduct of politics at
the national level, let alone at the state and local levels. One of the more
encouraging strands in the scholarship of the last generation has been recogni-
tion that in the new nation, party alignments largely coincided with the soci-
ety's religious divisions.16 From the outset of the. new nation, religious convic-
tions mixed together with perceived interests and ethnic loyalties in political
parties-although this basic American political institution was not envisioned
by the founders. Federalists provided a political program under which mem-
bers of the reconstituted Church of England and the Puritans of New England
could join, while various disestablished groups (Baptist, Catholic, Methodist,
and Presbyterian) clustered in the Democratic ranks.1 7 A considerable body of
14. NOONAN, supra note I, at 132 (quoting George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17,
1796), in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 220 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1896) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]).
15. Id.
16. For an early discussion of this phenomenon, see Seymour M. Lipset, Religion and Politics
in the American Past and Present, in RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONFLICT 69 (Robert Lee & Martin
E. Marty eds., 1964) [hereinafter Lipset, Religion and Politics]; see also JOHN L. HAMMOND,
THE POLITICS OF BENEVOLENCE 20-25 (Gerald M. Platted., 1979) (discussing the relationship
between religious belief and political behavior); SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION
289 (1963) (stating that the two-party system in the United States is divided along religious, as
well as class, ethnic, and regional lines).
17. Lipset, Religion and Politics, supra note 16, at 72-76. This is the underlying pattern Lipset
finds in the antebellum configuration. See id.
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scholarship now has explored the changing configurations of party politics
through the remainder of the nineteenth century. The constant is that ethno-
religious issues were correlated to a marked degree with both electoral divi-
sions at specific points in time and party alignments through time. 18
The basic insight is that religious allegiance continued as an important inde-
pendent variable in the dynamics of the political process; this in spite of the
prohibition of a religious test for federal office and the atrophy of the practice
at state and local levels. A paradox? Certainly not. The explicit exclusion of a
religious test for federal office in no significant way challenged, or even quali-
fied, divisions of the electorate along lines of religious preference any more
than it removed traditional religious sanctions from oaths. In this larger sense,
the assumption that religion has been separated from politics in America has
been one of the more enduring fictions in our history as a nation.
These perspectives on cultural construction lead to parallel observations re-
lating to the Establishment Clause in the early United States. Congress was
strictly enjoined from legislating "respecting an establishment of religion. '"1
Certainly no serious proposal was advanced to give systematic preference to a
particular religious body at the national level, or to challenge such an arrange-
ment where it existed at the state level. But this explicit legal understanding
did not call into question in any significant way the deep Protestant hegemony
of the culture. Indeed, to the minds of many, the nation had an indelibly
Christian character (the more substantial for being informal) that alone made
possible the formal independence of government and churches. This insight
was what later led G. K. Chesterton to term the United States "a nation with
the soul of a church."20 In the young nation, this commonplace linkage was
displayed in numerous ways and through actions both major and minor. The
point will gain force through concrete illustrations.
Possibly the most arresting exhibit is that of collective prayer on behalf of
the nation. Ironically, in retrospect, on the day after the House of Representa-
tives joined with the Senate (September 24, 1789) to adopt the language that
would eventually become the religion clauses of the First Amendment, it re-
solved to join the Senate in urging the President to recommend to the people
of the United States a day of thanksgiving, especially for the new "Constitu-
tion of government."21 Of course, such a "Day of Thanksgiving" seems very
much like official sponsorship of a religious ceremony. One member of the
House grasped the disjunction, if not outright contradiction, between this rec-
ommendation and the proposed prohibition on congressional action with re-
spect to both religious establishment and the free exercise of religion: St.
George Tucker of South Carolina, famous for his edition of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, sardonically opined that the people would not know whether to be
18. See, e.g., PAUL KLEPPNER, THE CROSS OF CULTURE: A SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF MIDWESTERN
POLITICS. 1850-1900, at 36-69 (1970) (discussing ethnic and religious voting in the Midwest).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
20. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, WHAT I SAW IN AMERICA 11-12 (1922).
21. 1 CONG. DEB. 913-14 (1834).
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thankful for the Constitution until they had experienced life under it; he added
the comment that "it is a business with which Congress have nothing to do; it
is a religious matter, and, as such, is proscribed to us."22
Nevertheless, Washington issued a proclamation authorizing that Thursday,
November 26, 1789, be observed as "a day of public thanksgiving and
prayer."123 As significant, John Adams followed suit in recommending that
Wednesday, May 9, 1798, be so observed because "the safety and prosperity
of nations ultimately and essentially depend on the protection and the blessing
of Almighty God, and the national acknowledgment of this truth is . ..an
indispensable duty which the people owe to Him."2 Although later in his life
Madison came to believe that such proclamations were wrong, while president
he actually designated the second Thursday of September 1813 as such a
day.25
Parenthetically, these early national "thanksgivings" are not to be under-
stood as annual harvest festivals, early versions of the routine Thanksgiving
Day festival that we now celebrate yearly in November. The presumed proto-
type of the twentieth-century holiday is found in the Plymouth Colony's legen-
dary feasting with the Native Americans who helped them survive the initial
harsh winter in the wilderness of the New World. Rather, these thanksgivings
were collective ritual events, whose prototype, as the language of the early
proclamations attests, was Israel's privileged access to Jahweh, a god believed
to lead and protect his special nation, a relationship chronicled in the scrip-
tures of that ancient people. This practice had been perfected by the English
Puritans who, as hebraized Englishmen, brought it to the New World where,
as Perry Miller emphasized, covenantal constructs were instrumental in bind-
ing together the new nation. 26 Such a collective national relationship to God,
at least in atrophied form, was premised in occasional thanksgiving celebra-
tions up through the Civil War. The modern annual harvest festival began
shortly thereafter. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson himself used language of this sort
most explicitly in his second inaugural address, making of the nation a corpo-
rate personality in relation to the God of ancient Israel 27-this despite the
"wall of separation" he advocated for the benefit of the Danbury Baptists. 8 In
the same vein, the two Houses of the new government arranged to be served
by chaplains even as they worked to refine the wording of the religion clauses
22. Id. at 915.
23. NOONAN. supra note 1, at 128 (quoting George Washington, Proclamation: A National
Thanksgiving (Oct. 3, 1789), in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 14, at 64).
24. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 129-30 (quoting John Adams, Proclamation of Thanksgiving
(Mar. 23, 1798), in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 14, at 268, 268-70).
25. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 131-32 (quoting 27 ANNALS OF CONG. 2673-74).
26. This theme was explicitly worked out in Perry Miller, From the Covenant to the Revival, in
THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN RELIGION 322 (James W. Smith & A. Leland Jamison eds., 1961).
27. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 131 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address
(March, 4, 1805), in, I MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 14, at 382).
28. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 130-31 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Bap-
tists (Jan. 1, 1802)).
[Vol. 41:821
RELIGION AND THE LA W
of the Bill of Rights. 29
These manifestations of the underlying religious (and decidedly Protestant
Christian) hegemony in the early nation and its repeated expression in and
natural links to the political culture suggest the complexity of our topic. The
extension of religious influence over into political activity, and its taken-for-
grantedness in the culture, may surprise us. But early nineteenth-century
Americans, unlike some of the French intellectuals who were their contempo-
raries, did not think their revolution had set out to purge the society of super-
stition in the guise of religion. While the First Amendment provisions (joined
to Article VI) clearly provided a limitation on federal power, they did not
signal an intention to substitute a secularized culture for one that was mark-
edly religious.
This point is elucidated by noting the somewhat ambiguous place of religion
in Congress' discussion of the framework for government in the new western
territories.3 Congress reserved the central section of each township for the
support of schools. The proposal to reserve an adjacent section to sup-
port churches eventually failed,31 but the conjunction of these two provisions in
the assumptions of the founding generation is clear. As they envisioned the
peopling of the land and the development of society in these protostates, they
found it unthinkable that religion and education should not provide their foun-
dation. Thus, the general importance of religion for the western lands was not
questioned (even if public funding for it was withheld), and the prevailing
hegemony authorized additional, and more explicit, cultural norms that ex-
pressed religious interests. Two examples will make this point. One is a pro-
scription, the treatment of blasphemy; the other a prescription, that the insti-
tution of marriage was to be conformed to a monogamous model.
For the first, a highly publicized blasphemy case, People v. Ruggles3" was
decided on appeal in New York and it held against the defendant. Ruggles
claimed that the New York constitution's no preference and free exercise
clauses-roughly parallel to the First Amendment religion clauses-protected
him in opining that Jesus was illegitimate and his mother a whore. Chief
Judge James Kent asserted that blasphemy was part of the common law be-
cause religion, moral discipline, and virtue were necessary to secure social soli-
darity and good order.3 Kent was explicit that Americans were "a Christian
people," and the guarantee of "free, equal and undisturbed enjoyment of reli-
gious opinion" was not a license to "revile, with malicious and blasphemous
29. See id. at 132.
30. See GAUSTAD, supra note 8, app. A at 151-56 (outlining the Northwest Ordinance of
1787).
31. See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 137-38.
32. 8 Johns. 225 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); see also H. Frank Way, The Death of the Christian
Nation: The Judiciary and the Church-State Relations, 29 J. CHURCH & STATE 509, 513-15
(1987) (discussing the Ruggles decision and noting the difficulty early litigants faced in relying on
constitutional "no preference" provisions).
33. Ruggles, 8 Johns. at 291.
34. Id. at 293-94.
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contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole community."3 So, de-
spite the New York constitution's ideal of no preference and its guarantee of
religious liberty, the court forged a linkage between the broadly Protestant
hegemony and proscribed behaviors. A comparable position evolved with re-
spect to proper observance of Sunday.36 Manifestly, at least to nineteenth-cen-
tury Americans, general Christian values sanctioned the proscription of both
blasphemy and inappropriate worldly activity on Sunday.
On the other hand, religious traditions prescribed the specific cultural shape
of the institution of marriage. This is a point of special interest because the
Protestant colonial traditions had desacralized marriage, making it a civil con-
tract and thus withdrawing it from traditional ecclesiastical control. Neverthe-
less, as a cultural construct, marriage as defined in civil law presupposed a
broadly Protestant Christian form for marriage. Much later, at the end of the
nineteenth century, Philip Schaff commented explicitly on this point, arguing
that the Supreme Court's then-recent polygamy decisions proved that religious
(Christian) and political interests inevitably intersected at certain points.37 He
believed that in prescribing monogamy (as well as public schooling and Sun-
day as a day of rest) "the American government and national sentiment have
...protected the principles and institutions of Christianity as essential ele-
ments in our conception of civilized society." 38
These practices point to the synergy between the Protestant religious he-
gemony of the early nation and the society created by actions of its govern-
ment; the force of the examples is the greater because so many originate with
the generation of the founders who drafted the three key provisions of the
Constitution (including the Bill of Rights) and were involved in the early elab-
oration of the new government.
I have described and analyzed to this point the spare provisions and the
limited reach of the federal framework of government for controlling the nine-
teenth-century American nation. These traits were especially marked with re-
gard to interaction between the federal government and cultural institutions,
prominent among them religious and educational ones. This did not mean,
however, that the early and evolving cultural substance of the nation was anti-
or even a-religious. The founders denied the new federal government compe-
tence in religious matters. But this denial was compatible with vital religion in
the national life; indeed, increasingly the national life presupposed the effects
of the prevailing Protestant cultural hegemony that understood itself as Chris-
tian in substance. Certainly, where that hegemony seemed to be challenged
directly-blasphemy or polygamy being prime examples-no constitutional
35. Id. at 294.
36. See Way, supra note 32, at 516 (stating that in early state court cases "courts responded to
litigation challenging the constitutionality of Sunday laws by reminding claimants that America
was a Christian nation").
37. PHILIP SCHAFF. CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (reprint ed. 1972), origi-
nally printed in 2 PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, No. 4 (1888).
38. Id.
[Vol. 41:821
RELIGION AND THE LA W
provisions at federal or state levels protected deviant behavior.
Fortunately, we have a very fine literature on many aspects of these larger
questions. Several highly regarded historical studies have probed the relation-
ship of Protestantism to the question of hegemony. Martin E. Marty's Right-
eous Empire suggests through its title both the scope of Protestant aspira-
tion-an imperial civilization with a Protestant core-and its peculiarly
uncritical moral presumption.39 For Marty, the failure of Reconstruction is the
hinge on which this story turns; in our terms, the Protestant hegemony slowly
dissolved as that program fragmented and especially Catholic and, to a lesser
degree, Jewish interests increased in power and influence."0
An alternative delineation of this outcome by Robert T. Handy proposes a
different timetable for conceiving of this relationship of Protestant forces to
the hegemony."1 He believes Protestant Christian civilization reached its apo-
gee in the Antebellum period, but its vision was cruelly dashed in the blood-
shed of civil war. 42 For Handy, the work of the next generation was twofold.
On the one hand, it continued the effort to sustain and extend the hegemony;
on the other, it redefined the hegemony to incorporate Catholic and, to some
degree, Jewish interests. Of course, this resulted among other things in an
increasingly alienated and fragmented Protestantism as it was displaced from
its privileged location in the culture. For Handy, then, these changes eventu-
ally worked themselves out between the two World Wars as a "second dises-
tablishment."'43 The first had been the legal detachment of religious institu-
tions from the federal government in the founding period followed by a similar
outcome at the state level; the second was the displacement of American Prot-
estantism from preeminence in the cultural hegemony.
III. RELIGION IN MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE
No doubt these scenarios could be elaborated to suggest specific stages in,
and certainly the details of, the evolving place of religion in the United States
over this period. That is clearly beyond the scope of this essay, although the
kinds of religious phenomena that need to be considered are evident. These
include the extraordinary multiplication of religious traditions and movements
(limited but growing numbers non-Christian), an increasing degree of organi-
zation among them, rising emphasis on distinctions between them, and a broad
range of religious innovations, not excluding rank entrepreneurialism. In one
respect, these developments produced the religious pluralism we have come to
take for granted. But they are obvious, so well known as to make recounting
them pedestrian. What may be more interesting is that the appeal of religion,
39. MARTIN E. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (Har-
old M. Hyman & Leonard W. Levy eds., 1970).
40. See id. at 158-65.
41. ROBERT T. HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL REALI-
TIES (1971).
42. See id. at 63-69.
43. Id. at 189-225.
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taken as particular and as generic, seems to have become increasingly private
and detached from common public concerns except possibly when consensus
emerged on occasions like mobilizing for or against war. For this reason, we
also need to come to terms with the question of religious subcultures-how
groups operate independently within the broader society. That is less obvious
and yet possibly more important, for through these groups a great deal of
religious influence was flowing directly into political life. This consideration
also reinforces choice of the hegemony concept; it indicates at once that the
place or role of religion in the political culture changes over time, and that,
whatever else its significance, religious influence also operates at or below the
level of consciousness.
To identify the precise stages in the religious evolution of the original cul-
ture is difficult. Roughly, by the early years of this century, the culture's reli-
gious cast was increasingly understood to be inclusively Christian,"" its specific
Protestant construction diminished in light of the dramatic growth and in-
creased influence of Catholic Christianity. By mid-twentieth century one
highly regarded analysis proposed that the religious hegemony was basically
tripartite, explicitly incorporating Jewish-Americans into a Judeo-Christian
cultural construct." This evolution surely has continued in the subsequent de-
cades. The religious components of the hegemony have been diversified well
beyond these limits. Elements of extra-Western traditions-Asian, Indian, and
Islamic, not to speak of Native American-are included and, as important,
there is far greater variety within its Jewish and Christian components.
At least until recently it was taken for granted in sophisticated circles that
what I am describing as the progressive religious enlargement of the hege-
monic culture was in fact a process of secularization. The stages that took the
United States from embodying Protestant versions of Christianity through an
inclusively Christian phase, subsequently enlarged to include Jewish traditions
as well as others, seemed to point to an American culture that finally would be
self-explicating without transcendent reference. 46 But such liberal intellectual
presumptions are, at least on first review, rudely called into question by events
in and beyond the United States. The dramatic discovery of politics by the
Religious Right in particular, coinciding with the resurgence of militant tradi-
tions in other societies, has put a question mark against simple progressive
interpretations. Conservatism has broadly gained strength and there has been
a rearrangement of religious positions within each tradition, along a liberal-
conservative axis."' Thus the culture seems to have become more diversified in
44. See the discussion by James Bryce, who in the late nineteenth century thought Christianity
was the "national religion." 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 770 (1911).
45. See WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEw 52 (1955) (stating that Protestantism,
Catholicism, and Judaism are the "three great . . . divisions in America").
46. See PETER L. BERGER. THE SACRED CANOPY 105-71 (1969) (discussing the secularization
of American culture).
47. See WUTHNOW, supra note 3, at 132-41, 317-22 (discussing religious alignment along polit-
ical lines).
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terms of its religious sources and also to have become significantly polarized
within itself.
An argument with a different spin is also made, however, that-in its effect
at least-the revitalization of contemporary religious life has been primarily
private. The enhanced religious pluralism of modern America has developed in
the realm of personal choice. By contrast, the cultural hegemony has had a
reduced religious content.' 8 In this view, "secularization" has occurred at the
level of the hegemonic culture, for our complex governmental structure in-
creasingly resembles other modern states and is supported by corporate and
educational monopolies from which religious impulses, movements, and insti-
tutions, however revitalized, have been notably excluded.
In a longer view, it may be premature to conclude that the public arena has
been decisively secularized, religion's influence-beginning with that of Protes-
tantism-radically diminished. But at a more mundane level what is clear is
the significantly changed relationship, beginning in the 1940s, between the
First Amendment provisions regarding religion and the current social and cul-
tural context. In the founding of the nation, all three religion clauses
amounted to explicit guarantees that the new federal government would forgo
the typical and explicit religious linkages available to it-although the clauses
did not explicitly acknowledge that the religious hegemony of the culture
would be presupposed. In the last half of the twentieth century, the First
Amendment provisions were resurrected, first as limiting all levels of govern-
ment, and second as grounds for individuals and groups to claim rights to
religious liberty. Intended or not, these clauses have been transformed into
prospective ground rules for negotiating the pluralism of the culture. Indeed,
the motivation behind modern separationist-and also to some extent accom-
modationist-readings of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has
been to enlist them as articles of common agreement in the new, self-con-
scious, religiously plural social order of the last half-century. This historically
new role, which has become so familiar to us, is marvelously ironic. For the
clauses that were crafted to keep Congress from interfering with the various
regional expressions of religious hegemony in the states have become the basis
for challenges to vestiges of that hegemony-whether they be legislative or
school prayers, creches, or military authority over dress codes. Thus, at one
level of irony, the religion clauses of the First Amendment have become appro-
48. See JAMES D. HUNTER, EVANGELICALISM: THE COMING GENERATION 191-92 (1987).
Hunter stated:
The collapse of the cultural hegemony of pre-twentieth-century Protestantism has
taken place in two principal stages. The "first disestablishment" took place in the last
decade of the nineteenth century and the first two and a half decades of the twentieth
century, and was primarily concerned with the theological facet of the cultural
system. . ..
The second disestablishment has involved the decline of the moral and familial fac-
ets of the traditional Protestant world view.
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priated to specific purposes directly opposed to those that led to their adoption.
At the same time, however, to discover another level of irony, they may have
come in a quite different way to serve comparable broader objectives-to leave
religious practice unhindered and to make institutional religion independent of
government.
IV. RELIGION IN THE FUTURE
From this point of view, our inquiry might turn in at least two different
directions. One would be to the extensive and ramifying litigation of the last
half-century under these clauses, whether taken singly or as interactive, which
has charted the contours of current church-state law.'0 Fortunately, distin-
guished scholars have explored the particulars of this story as well as its range.
Another direction of inquiry that opens out from our framing of the question
is boldly to ask several larger questions in light of this historical perspective.
From a vantage point we might project into the future, shall I say safely into
the next century, how will developments in our era be interpreted in terms of
changing relationships among religion, the political culture, and the law?
First, we might ask whether the religion clauses will continue to operate
independently and in some degree of tension (assuming that Article VI, Sec-
tion 3, will have no further independent existence). At the very least, the con-
stitutional provision for religion is highly anomalous, for other fundamental
freedoms, like those of speech and assembly, have become construed as
straightforward rights. It could be argued that the original denial to Congress
of authority to legislate "respecting an establishment" was effectively to pro-
tect the religious freedom of the states50 Since such free exercise with respect
to religion is now denied to the states, in a narrow sense the Establishment
Clause might be pronounced redundant. Is it the logic of developing jurispru-
dence that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses will be effectively
merged? Will the original three clauses eventually reduce to function as one?
An arresting proposal that the two First Amendment clauses were closely
yoked was made some years ago by Philip Kurland. He argued:
The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single pre-
cept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or in-
49. See ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY:
CHURCH. STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1987) (outlining the history of church-state
litigation before the Supreme Court).
50. This is the most compelling interpretation of the process of revising the language of the
religion clauses that took place in the First Congress. For general colonial background, see
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). In this connection, for a different view see also LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 89, 95-99 (1986)
(rejecting the nonpreferentialist view in favor of the belief that the government has no power at all
to legislate on the subject of religion); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Under-
standing of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1511-12 (1990) (arguing that the
Free Exercise Clause mandates religious exemptions from secular laws).
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action because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classi-
fication in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden.5 1
Because it denies any general force to the claims made under the category
"religion," the net outcome of such an approach is effective secularization. It
seems to render the clauses altogether superfluous-they become devoid of
content-and to lodge any significant content of the clauses under other liber-
ties. At least to this point the Court has not taken this path.
Since the Kurland proposal was made, of course, litigation has continued to
come forward under each clause separately and often has been resolved in
isolation. Further, the current Chief Justice in a 1981 dissent explicitly re-
flected on the "'tension' between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." 2 Indeed, he in-
troduced a possibly unfortunate classical image in commenting, "By broadly
construing both Clauses, the Court has constantly narrowed the channel be-
tween the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal action
must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutiny."53 Until recently we
might have expected that in this changing interaction between the clauses, the
free exercise provision would emerge as primary. But at a minimum the deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith signals that their relationship is far
from settled.54 So the interaction of the two clauses remains a continuing ques-
tion. Thus, one open-ended set of issues concerns the religion clauses, their
status, and how we conceptualize them. As if to mock the quest for their
"original intent," the construction currently given to them and the range of
their application make clear the distance they have travelled from their origi-
nal context.
In the perspective this essay has urged as a thought experiment (looking
back on our era from the twenty-first century), another arresting issue surely
will concern the matter of hegemony in the culture. We have already noted
that the clauses originated as denying to the federal government competence
with respect to religion. But this move left the hegemony, including its reli-
gious elements, in place and operative. But by the late twentieth century the
clauses have come to be construed in such a way as to limit severely govern-
ment involvement with religious aspects of the contemporary hegemonic cul-
ture (begging for a moment the question of its shape). Construed in this way,
the clauses have lent themselves to secular trends in the culture and thus may
actively serve to reduce the place and influence of religion. Surely this is an
ironic disposition for provisions enacted to secure existing religious practices in
the original states. On this point, one line of reconsideration suggested by the
51. PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 111-12 (1962).
52. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws to ceremonial use of peyote, and thus
Oregon could deny the claimants unemployment compensation based on their drug use).
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Chief Justice among others is to modify, qualify, or reverse the logic by which
these clauses have been incorporated. In his view, a nonpreferentialist outcome
would be a truer application of their original genius."'
I have made much of the largely Protestant Christian cast of the religious
hegemony in the early nation. And the evolution I have sketched has decisively
taken us toward a radical pluralization of the religious componentsof the cul-
ture. Does this mean that the hegemonic culture has become increasingly secu-
lar? To adapt Robert Handy's terms, will our era subsequently be seen as that
of a "third disestablishment" of religion, 56 this time from its place in the hege-
monic culture? As a result of late-twentieth-century religious pluralism and
the related transposition of religious belief and practice into private space and
time, has religion now become decisively marginalized? To adopt Washing-
ton's posing of the question, do oaths any longer rest on a sense of religious
obligation? Have other institutions-educational, corporate, governmental,
cultural-become the effective locations (if there are any) for transmitting,
inculcating, and enforcing the moral foundations for modern social life? In
asking such questions we probe the fundamental framework of the American
national community, and the degree to which the society may now have be-
come a basically secular political culture.
Here we make the transition to a third and final set of questions flowing
from our vantage point in the new century. Separate from these questions
about the relationship between and status of the clauses, and from reflections
concerning cultural hegemony and the political culture, lies the issue of the
theory of government and society. One of the characteristically American
qualities of the founders was that they knew their theorists-and drew on
them; they might best be described as "practical theoreticians." Their practi-
cal step in proposing to place religion beyond the competence of the new gov-
ernment rested on theoretical grounds. Put another way, the independence of
religion and government they constitutionalized was part of a consistent pro-
gram. This had to do with the founders' ideal of limiting government and their
choice of specific institutional means to make such a government more likely
to endure. Thus, devices like separating powers, creating checks and balances,
and crafting schemes of representation were means through which they went
about their constitution-making. While there is little direct evidence, with the
exception of James Madison, that locates their thinking about religion and
government in this framework, logic drives us to do so, that is, to reflect on the
religion clauses in relationship to the design of the broader polity.
Even when and where it has become thoroughly plural and largely private,
religion is after all, like politics, concerned with power. Rendering government
independent of churches was one expression of that drive to limit power and
hedge it around with adequate safeguards that we find throughout the foun-
ders' work. So beyond the interpretation of the clauses, and in addition to the
55. Wallace v. Jaffree, 424 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. See supra notes 43, 48 and accompanying text (discussing the "first" and "second
disestablishment").
[Vol. 41:821
RELIGION AND THE LAW
recognition of the new problems posed by the changing place of religion in the
society's hegemonic culture, is this theoretical issue: How does the founders'
concern for separating powers and limiting the abuses of power translate into
our contemporary polity as it relates to religion, a polity in which positive
functions have transformed the nature and scope of governmental action?
Some term like "cultural federalism" may be the best means for us to ap-
proach understanding of the fundamental ground rules law codifies with re-
spect to religion in our society.
In important respects, such a concept as cultural federalism must be seen as
directly challenging that of cultural hegemony. The latter is an analytic under-
standing of the powerful dynamics at work in every society to limit conflict
and dissent in the interests of stability; the former is essentially a constitu-
tional construct to provide "elbow room" in the society for dissent, diversity,
and finally cultural change. Treating republican theory as if it reached only to
the political instrumentalities of society effectively reduces its implications and
makes the national experience of the United States seem accidental and with-
out relevance elsewhere.
This issue of "cultural federalism" is infrequently if ever broached by con-
stitutional scholars, and certainly not by many political theoreticians or even
journalists as they reflect on religion in modern America and its status in law.
Most have tended to accept prevailing intellectual currents that dismiss reli-
gion as socially unimportant and lacking in potential influence. Neither does it
seem to be an issue explicitly reflected upon by the courts as they have faced a
rising tide of litigation. In fact, however, the broad sweep of decisions the
Supreme Court has produced under the First Amendment religion clauses has
actually summed to a fair attempt to keep religion independent of government
so as to frame and respect something like cultural federalism.5 7 No one of the
Court's opinions taken by itself clearly exemplifies this deeper theoretical in-
sight into the design of the polity, but their net effect might be read in such a
light.
CONCLUSION
One interesting aspect of approaching a subject as a cultural construct is
that unexpected or contradictory, if not paradoxical, elements emerge to view.
Thus, historians love the category of irony or contradiction, for-like tellers of
stories or recounters of tales-they attempt to deal with untidy events and
ambiguous motivations. In our late-twentieth century, it is important for the
American people to take note of how relevant religion has in fact been to our
national community. We must join to this insight an appreciation for the foun-
ders and the broader implications of their thought. What they bequeathed to
57. Of course this balancing act has been called into question by the logic of Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a searching discussion of its implications, see generally Doug-
las Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. I (discussing the implications
of the Smith case and arguing for exemptions for most religious minority groups).
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us with respect to thinking about religion is much less explicitly formulated
than we might wish. Certainly, that thinking is less usefully conceived of as
abiding principles crafted into Olympian clauses than as wise provisions for
their time arising out of clashes in their immediate and diverging experiences.
But however much the formulations bear the stamp of their origins, they were
not ad hoc. In this sense they were of a piece with their entire constitutional
achievement. Thus, we need to learn from and appropriate the founders' wis-
dom even as we study and seek to apply their provisions. To understand the
formulations we must place them in the setting of the original hegemony even
as we ask how to translate them into our time. Above all, we must recognize
that to have application, now and in the future, they must address the place of
religion in our political culture. Only in such a fashion can the founders' con-
sensus about religion and its place in the polity constructively inform modern
American society. We can surely hope that specialists in both law and religion,
among others, will share in this task.
